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Case Note 
VOID CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF  
CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES TO CONSEQUENTIAL 
RESTITUTIONARY CLAIMS 
CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd 
[2008] 4 SLR 543 
This note examines the Singapore Court of Appeal’s 
judgment in CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd, 
focusing specifically on what role, if any, should be played by 
a choice of law clause contained in a void contract in relation 
to the restitutionary aftermath of voidness. 
Adeline CHONG∗ 
LLB (Birmingham), PhD (Nottingham); 
Assistant Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 In CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd,1 the Singapore 
Court of Appeal had the opportunity to investigate what role should be 
played by a choice of law clause contained in a contract which is 
conceded to be void in relation to the restitutionary aftermath of the 
voidness. This issue will form the focal point of this note. 
2 The case arose out of the sale of promissory notes by CIMB to 
Dresdner for approximately US$8.2m. The sale had been arranged, on 
CIMB’s part, by one of its employees at its Inanam branch, George 
Chau. The contract between CIMB and Dresdner contained an English 
choice of law clause. It later transpired that the promissory notes had 
been issued in relation to a non-existent project, the whole thing being a 
fraud perpetrated by George Chau. Dresdner instituted an action for the 
return of the US$8.2m on the basis of unjust enrichment. CIMB then 
applied to have the action stayed on the basis of forum non conveniens, 
                                                                       
∗ The author would like to thank Professor Yeo Tiong Min for suggesting that this 
case should be looked at in the first place and also his helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. All errors remain the author’s own. 
1 [2008] 4 SLR 543. 
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arguing that England was the more appropriate forum.2 In the course of 
applying the Spiliada test3 on whether Singapore or some other forum 
was the more appropriate forum, the Court of Appeal had to consider 
what the applicable law of the unjust enrichment claim was, this being a 
factor indicating where the centre of gravity of the case lay. 
3 The court was clear that one had to draw a distinction between 
a case where the parties agree that there is no agreement at all, such as in 
the present action, and a case where the parties disagree as to whether 
there is an agreement between them. In the latter situation, the court 
advocated the putative applicable law approach, ie, application of the 
law that would govern the contract if it were valid, to determine if the 
contract is valid. Although this is the generally adopted solution for the 
classic conflicts conundrum of which law determines if a contract is 
void,4 there is room for a subtler approach to this issue.5 However, given 
that Dresdner gave an undertaking that for the purposes of this action, 
it would not maintain that the agreement was valid, the opportunity to 
investigate alternative approaches did not arise. Instead, the central issue 
that the court faced was whether a choice of law clause contained in an 
admitted void contract could provide the applicable law of the unjust 
enrichment claim. 
4 Before going into the specifics of the judgment, it must be 
pointed out that Dresdner’s concession that there was no “agreement” is 
to be equated with a concession that there was no valid contract 
between the parties. The importance of this point will be apparent later. 
II. The judgment 
5 In order to determine what the applicable law of the unjust 
enrichment claim was, the court had to first determine what the choice 
                                                                       
2 Dresdner instituted the Singapore proceedings to make sure it was within the 
limitation period; it then promptly applied for a temporary stay whilst it awaited 
the outcome of German proceedings that had been brought against it by the 
ultimate purchasers of the dishonoured promissory notes. CIMB, on the other 
hand, requested a permanent stay of the Singapore action. 
3 Test derived from Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex [1987] AC 460. 
4 Eg, Art 10(1) of the Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations 
(Rome I); Albeko Schumaschinen v The Kamborian Shoe Machine Co (1961) 
111 LJ 519. 
5 See, for example, Adrian Briggs, “The Formation of International Contracts” 
[1990] LMCLQ 192; Jonathan Harris, “Does Choice of Law Make Any Sense?” 
(2004) 57 Current Legal Problems 305 at 316–324; Adeline Chong, “Choice of Law 
for Void Contracts and Their Restitutionary Aftermath: The Putative Governing 
Law of the Contract” in Re-examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment (Paula 
Giliker ed) (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) at pp 155–170. 
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of law rule is for unjust enrichment. Here, the court applied r 230 of 
Dicey, Morris and Collins which sets out that:6 
(1) The obligation to restore the benefit of an enrichment 
obtained at another person’s expense is governed by the proper law of 
the obligation. 
(2) The proper law of the obligation is (semble) determined as 
follows: 
(a) If the obligation arises in connection with a 
contract, its proper law is the law applicable to the contract; 
(b) If it arises in connection with a transaction 
concerning an immovable (land), its proper law is the law of 
the country where the immovable is situated (lex situs); 
(c) If it arises in any other circumstances, its proper law 
is the law of the country where the enrichment occurs. 
6 It was common ground that sub-r 2(b) was inapplicable given 
that the transaction did not involve any land. The issue was whether 
sub-r 2(a) or sub-r 2(c) provided the applicable law. CIMB argued that 
sub-r 2(a) applied and pointed towards English law because of the 
English choice of law clause, whereas Dresdner relied on sub-r 2(c) to 
maintain that Singapore law, being the law of the place of enrichment as 
Dresdner had remitted the money to CIMB Singapore, provided the 
proper law of the restitutionary obligation. 
7 CIMB’s argument that the English choice of law clause in the 
void contract should be given effect to govern the restitutionary 
consequences was thought by the court to be somewhat mischievous, 
given that CIMB had asserted that George Chau did not have the 
authority to enter into the agreement on its behalf and hence CIMB did 
not intend to enter into any contract. CIMB argued, however, that on 
Dresdner’s part, there was such an intention. The court observed: “[T]he 
entire situation smacked of CIMB wanting to have its cake and eat 
it too.”7 
8 Central to the court’s reasoning was the assessment of whether 
there had been a “meeting of minds” between the parties. So, if the 
parties had intended to enter into a contract, but some factor renders 
the contract ineffective or a failure, a choice of law clause contained in 
the ineffective or failed contract should be given effect to govern the 
                                                                       
6 Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (Lawrence Collins gen ed) (Sweet 
& Maxwell, 14th Ed, 2006). 
7 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [43]. Yet there is more merit to CIMB’s argument than the 
court gave credit for, although it is suggested that CIMB did not quite make the 
correct argument; see Part III of this article. 
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consequential restitutionary obligation.8 If there was no “meeting of 
minds” to enter into the contract at all and in effect there was no 
contract, then the choice of law clause has no further application.9 
9 Furthermore, the court held that one needed to examine 
whether the factor which rendered the contract void also rendered the 
choice of law clause void.10 The court noted that the defence of non est 
factum would strike down all the terms of a contract, including any 
express choice of law clause, whereas vitiating factors such as fraud, 
duress or common mistake as to the subject matter of the contract 
needed to be scrutinised further to see if they directly impugned any 
express choice of law clause. If the clause is not impugned, then there 
are grounds for contending that the law stipulated in the clause should 
govern the restitutionary consequences. 
10 Applying these principles to the present case, the court held that 
there was no “meeting of minds” between the parties since it was 
common ground that there was no contract. Alternatively, the fraud 
perpetrated by George Chau infected the entire “agreement”.11 Thus, the 
English choice of law clause did not bind the parties. Sub-r 2(a) was 
inapplicable and the present action instead fell within sub-r 2(c). Given 
that Dresdner had transferred the money to CIMB Singapore and 
Singapore was also the place where CIMB allegedly changed its position 
by remitting the money to HSBC Hong Kong,12 the court had no 
hesitation in holding that Singapore was the place of enrichment.13 
Hence, Singapore law was the applicable law of the unjust enrichment 
claim.14 
11 Upon considering other additional factors, such as the 
possibility of related third party actions by CIMB and the availability of 
relevant witnesses, the court concluded that it was not established that 
                                                                       
8 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [41]. 
9 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [50]. 
10 In relation to this, the court referred to the “infection” test propounded by Harris 
(Jonathan Harris, “Does Choice of Law Make Any Sense?” (2004) 57 Current Legal 
Problems 305), ie, one has to examine if the factor rendering the contract invalid 
“infects” the choice of law clause too. 
11 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [54]. 
12 CIMB Singapore transferred the money over to HSBC Hong Kong in favour of an 
unrelated third party company seemingly pursuant to fraudulent instructions 
issued by George Chau and another employee of CIMB. 
13 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [60]. 
14 Rather interestingly, the court noted ultimately that even if they had concluded 
that the applicable law of the unjust enrichment claim was English, rather than 
Singapore law, this would not have been a factor of much significance when 
applying the forum non conveniens test as the Singapore law on unjust enrichment 
was said to be similar, if not identical, to the English law on unjust enrichment. See 
[2008] 4 SLR 543 at [63]. 
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England was the more appropriate forum for trial of the action. 
Accordingly, CIMB’s application for a stay of the Singapore proceedings 
was denied. 
III. Analysis 
12 The court’s exposition of the principles as to when an express 
choice of law clause could be said to survive contractual invalidity was 
careful and precise. The recognition that the important factor was 
whether there was a “meeting of minds” between the parties and 
needing to assess whether the grounds of the contractual failure directly 
impugned the choice of law clause demonstrated a clarity of judicial 
reasoning in this fraught area that should be applauded. 
13 That said, it may be questioned whether the court accurately 
applied those principles to the case at hand. The court stressed several 
times that they were not dealing with a situation where there was a 
contract which the parties intended to enter into but which 
subsequently failed, but rather a situation where both parties 
acknowledged that there was no “agreement”. This, to the court’s mind, 
meant that there was no “meeting of minds”, and therefore, the English 
choice of law clause did not bind both parties.15 
14 With respect, the conclusion that Dresdner’s concession that 
there was no contract between Dresdner and CIMB meant that there 
was no “meeting of minds” between the two parties was not an 
irresistible one. Even when Dresdner was informed by CIMB London 
that George Chau did not have the authority to enter into that 
particular transaction, Dresdner persisted in remitting the US$8.2m to 
CIMB Singapore.16 Upon payment, CIMB London, despite all their 
earlier warnings to Dresdner about George Chau’s lack of authority to 
enter into the transaction on their behalf, passed the promissory notes 
to Dresdner. It is untenable that either party did these actions on a 
whim. Dresdner’s actions in remitting the money and CIMB’s actions in 
handing the promissory notes over can be traced back to the void 
contract containing the English choice of law clause. 
15 The point being made here is that the “agreement” was executed 
by both sides. Objectively construed, there is a strong argument that 
although there may have been no valid binding contract between the two 
parties, there was an “agreement”, ie, there was a “meeting of minds” 
between Dresdner and CIMB that was sufficient at least to compel the 
                                                                       
15 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [56]. 
16 This was probably because of an oversight on Dresdner’s part; see [2008] 4 SLR 543 
at [28]. 
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parties’ actions. Therefore, the English choice of law clause should have 
been held to survive the acknowledgment that there was no contract 
and held to be the applicable law of the unjust enrichment claim.17 
16 The alternative reason used, ie, that the vitiating factor was the 
fraud perpetrated by George Chau against both Dresdner and CIMB 
and this fraud “infected” the entire contract, including the English 
choice of law clause,18 could also have merited further probing. Fraud, 
whether under English or Singapore domestic contract law,19 merely 
renders a contract voidable, not void. If fraud were the vitiating factor, 
then there is actually a contract which did exist, but is now treated as if 
it never did exist upon avoidance.20 Given that there was a contract prior 
to the moment of avoidance, this brings one back full circle to the point 
that there initially was a “meeting of minds” between the parties. In 
addition, the court should have, in accordance with the principles it had 
so clearly articulated, assessed independently whether the fraud directly 
impugned the choice of law clause itself.21 
IV. Further points 
17 The court’s judgment raises certain issues associated with the 
survivability of choice of law clauses contained in void contracts that 
may benefit from some further exploration. 
A. Meeting of minds 
18 Notwithstanding its judgment on the facts of the case, it is 
unlikely that the court meant that only a valid contract would indicate 
that there has been a meeting of minds between the parties. The court 
had noted that the presence of vitiating factors such as fraud, duress or 
common mistake as to the subject matter of the contract would not 
necessarily mean that the parties did not have the intention to enter into 
a contract.22 Therefore, although the court did not elaborate on what 
“meeting of minds” means, it is probably fair conjecture that the court 
                                                                       
17 Sub-r 2(a) covers claims arising from a void contract: Dicey, Morris and Collins on 
the Conflict of Laws (Lawrence Collins gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 14th Ed, 2006) at 
para 34-020. 
18 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [54]. 
19 If one ignores the English choice of law clause, the objective proper law of the 
contract is probably either English or Singapore law. 
20 Paraphrasing Yeo Tiong Min, Choice of Law for Equitable Doctrines (OUP, 2004) at 
para 9.22. 
21 As the court noted, it would be “rare” for the fraud to have directly impacted on 
the victim’s decision to agree to the choice of law clause itself: [2008] 4 SLR 543 
at [46]. 
22 See especially [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [46]–[47]. 
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meant stripping down a bargain to its bare essentials. In relation to this, 
most, if not all, legal systems would accept that there is a “meeting of 
minds” when there is an offer and a matching acceptance. Other 
elements, such as the common law requirement of consideration, are 
submitted to be extraneous to the enquiry as to whether there has been 
a “meeting of minds”. 
19 In most instances, the question of whether the parties’ minds 
have met would be a purely factual one. However, sometimes, questions 
of law may arise. Issues such as whether silence constitutes acceptance, 
whether the defence of non est factum is made out, or whether a postal 
acceptance which goes awry constitutes valid acceptance, all involve 
questions of law. This then leads to the query: which law should 
determine whether there has been a “meeting of minds”? 
20 As mentioned earlier, when the parties are in dispute as to 
whether a contract exists between them, the generally accepted 
approach is application of the putative governing law of the contract. 
This was approved by the court who noted that: “Such a rule makes 
good practical sense because otherwise it would mean that a mere 
allegation on the part of the defendant that there was fraud would 
suffice to neutralise the effect of the … choice of law clause in the 
agreement.”23 This argument works the other way round too. If an 
illiterate man concludes a contract thinking that he is signing a tenancy 
agreement when he is signing a contract of sale, it would be unfair on 
him to give effect to a choice of law clause cannily inserted into the 
contract by the other party for Ruritanian law, under which there is no 
defence of non est factum. There is a strong case for a more principled 
basis upon which to determine whether a contract is void rather than 
just simply applying the law stipulated in a choice of law clause in a 
disputed contract.24 Similarly, it is submitted that the putative governing 
law of the contract should not govern the question of whether there has 
been a “meeting of minds” between the parties when one is determining 
whether an express choice of law clause in a void contract should be 
applied to the restitutionary consequences of voidness. 
21 It is suggested that the law which is best suited to determine this 
issue is the lex fori. Admittedly, use of the lex fori has its own drawbacks. 
On the one hand, it can be considered to be parochial and may have 
little connection with the facts. On the other hand, if the parties have 
                                                                       
23 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [30]. 
24 See, for example, Adrian Briggs, “The Formation of International Contracts” 
[1990] LMCLQ 192; Jonathan Harris, “Does Choice of Law Make Any Sense?” 
(2004) 57 Current Legal Problems 305 at 316–324; Adeline Chong, “Choice of Law 
for Void Contracts and Their Restitutionary Aftermath: The Putative Governing 
Law of the Contract” in Re-examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment (Paula 
Giliker ed) (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) at pp 155–170. 
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chosen to sue and submit in the forum, the parties agree to be subjected 
to the forum’s choice of law rules. They then have little cause to 
complain if the choice of law rules of the lex fori dictate that the 
preliminary issue of whether the parties have had a “meeting of minds” 
is to be assessed by a stripped down version of the lex fori’s domestic 
contract law. Alternatively, if the court has exercised long arm 
jurisdiction on the basis of O 11 of the Rules of Court,25 some sort of 
connection with Singapore is insisted upon so there is justification for 
applying Singaporean rules on whether there has been a “meeting of 
minds” between the parties. One should also note that Singapore law is 
not advocated to be the law which would apply to the substance of the 
restitutionary claim; it merely plays a preliminary role in determining 
what the applicable law of the restitutionary claim should be. Thus, if 
Singapore domestic contract law on offer and acceptance finds that 
there has been consensus between the parties, then any express choice of 
law clause in the void contract can be given effect and it is that law 
which will go on to govern the restitutionary claim. Applying this on the 
facts of CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd, it has been argued 
that a matching offer and acceptance can be derived from an objective 
overview of the parties’ actions. 
B. Illogicality 
22 The second issue that crops up is this: if the contract is void, 
how can it have a governing law and how can that governing law be 
applied to the restitutionary consequences of voidness? One could 
possibly justify use of the putative governing law of the contract to 
determine whether the contract is valid, but when the voidness of the 
contract has already been established, it is sheer illogicality still to call 
upon this law. 
23 There are nevertheless strong pragmatic reasons to justify 
applying the putative governing law of a contract to the restitutionary 
consequences. First, party expectations would probably be that any law 
which they choose to govern their contract would not only govern 
disputes arising out of the contract but also any consequences arising 
from the failure of the contract. It is unlikely that the parties intended 
one law to govern any contractual disputes and a different law to govern 
non-contractual disputes between them if those disputes arose out of 
the same transaction. Secondly, application of the putative governing 
law to the consequences of voidness will lead to a certain symmetry26 
                                                                       
25 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed. 
26 That said, it is not suggested that the law which strikes down a contract should 
invariably be applied to the consequences of voidness. Eg, if the contract is void 
because it is against forum public policy, the applicable law of the unjust 
enrichment claim is still suggested to be the putative governing law of the contract. 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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because that same law would have determined the contract’s voidness. 
This symmetry serves several functions. In addition to the advantages of 
practicality and convenience, the risk of inconsistency can be side-
stepped. For example, the contract may be held to be void by the 
putative governing law of the contract, the law of country A, but the law 
of country B is instead applied to the restitutionary consequences. It 
might be though that according to the law of country B, the contract is 
valid and not void. 
24 Thus, as the court explained:27 
One answer [to the criticism of illogicality] is that perhaps it is 
convenient and pragmatic to adopt that rule and, arguably, such an 
approach was probably in line with the expectations of the parties. 
This approach seems to be premised on the assumption that the 
choice of law clause can be regarded as separable from the contract 
itself. If the law applicable to a contract determines that it is void, it is 
not obviously desirable, or commercially sensible, for a different law 
then to be applied to determine the restitutionary consequences of this 
voidness. 
25 Two further justifications can be added to what has been set out 
above. One is that any lingering problems of whether certain claims are 
contractual or restitutionary28 would not pose a hurdle at the conflicts 
stage as the same law would be applicable no matter how the 
characterisation exercise is carried out. Another, and crucial, point is 
that the putative governing law of the contract will, more often than not, 
be the law of closest connection to the unjust enrichment claim. As Lord 
Penrose has observed:29 
… at the very least the attempt of parties to make a contract governed 
by or putatively governed by a chosen system of law or by a system 
selected on conventional conflict principles, remains a reality 
irrespective of whether or not they succeed in that attempt, and in 
particular remained a reality at the date of the performance tendered. 
                                                                                                                               
The lex fori merely plays the normal subsidiary role of stepping in only if the effect 
of applying the foreign governing law of the contract to the restitutionary 
aftermath offends forum public policy. See Adeline Chong, “Choice of Law for 
Void Contracts and Their Restitutionary Aftermath: The Putative Governing Law 
of the Contract” in Re-examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment (Paula 
Giliker ed) (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) at pp 176–181. 
27 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [33]. 
28 Eg, the question mark over rescission; see Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution 
(Butterworths, 2nd Ed, 2002) at pp 56–60. 
29 Baring Brothers v Cunninghame District Council [1997] CLC 108 at 126. However, it 
should be noted that even though Lord Penrose recognised the significance of the 
parties’ attempt to create a contract, he rejected the straightforward application of 
the putative proper law of the contract to govern the restitutionary claim in favour 
of a more flexible law of closest connection approach. 
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26 With reference to the facts of the case, the actions of Dresdner 
and CIMB in paying over the money and passing the promissory notes 
can only be explained on the basis that both parties (despite any 
protestations to the contrary) thought or acted as if there was some sort 
of legal relationship between them. Given that the assumed contract 
formed the basis for the parties’ actions and is the reason why any 
enrichment occurred at all, the putative governing law of the contract 
should have been held to be the applicable law of the unjust enrichment 
claim. 
C. The separability of the choice of law clause 
27 The court briefly made reference to the idea that a choice of law 
clause is separable from the other terms of the contract in the passage 
reproduced above.30 The idea of separability enables one to justify why a 
law stipulated in a choice of law clause could go on to govern the 
restitutionary consequences of contractual invalidity when the other 
contractual terms have been struck out. 
28 The concept of the separability of the choice of law clause does 
not wholly cohere with the court’s reasoning on whether there has been 
a “meeting of minds” between the parties. Under this strand of the 
court’s analysis, one examines whether the parties had reached a 
“meeting of minds” on the contract as a whole, whereas if the idea of 
separability of the choice of law clause is to be fully embraced, one 
should examine if there has been a “meeting of minds” on the choice of 
law clause itself. 
29 The idea of the separability of the choice of law clause has more 
relevance to the court’s suggestion that one has to examine 
independently whether the vitiating factor directly impugns the choice 
of law clause. It is implicit that the court envisages a situation where the 
other terms of the contract may have fallen down, but the choice of law 
clause survives to govern the consequences of the failure of the contract. 
The court though provided little hint in its judgment as to whether the 
isolation of a choice of law clause in this manner is to be viewed as a 
legal or policy construct. 
30 The answer to this is probably: both. One argument that could 
be made is that contracts do not exist in a legal vacuum. Important 
terms in a contract, such as “currency”, “payment” and “damages”, only 
have meaning when referred to a legal system. As Lord Diplock put it:31 
                                                                       
30 In para 24 of this article. 
31 Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50 at 65. 
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[C]ontracts … are mere pieces of paper devoid of all legal effect unless 
they were made by reference to some system of private law which 
defines the obligations assumed by the parties to the contract by their 
use of particular forms of words and prescribes the remedies 
enforceable … 
31 In this sense, a choice of law clause can be said to inhabit a 
higher jurisprudential plane compared to the other substantive terms of 
the contract, and thus, legally speaking, it is separable from the contract. 
Alternatively, one could argue, as Briggs does, that a choice of law clause, 
along with any jurisdiction clause and arbitration agreement, forms part 
of the parties’ attempt to set up a dispute resolution mechanism.32 This 
mechanism must be separable from the performance obligations of the 
contract otherwise it would be of no utility. In addition, the pragmatic 
reasons set out earlier33 as to why the criticism of illogicality should not 
be a hurdle to giving effect to a choice of law clause contained in a void 
contract, ie, that this protects party expectations, prevents inconsistent 
outcomes, minimises characterisation problems and points towards the 
law of closest connection to the unjust enrichment claim, provide 
compelling justification to warrant treating a choice of law clause as 
being separable from the substantive provisions in a contract as a matter 
of policy.34 
32 A related question is: what law determines whether the choice 
of law clause can be severed from the contract in which it is contained? 
Academic discussion on this issue favours the putative governing law of 
the contract determining whether the choice of law clause is separable 
from the contract and capable of surviving the invalidity of the 
contract.35 Since it is best to minimise the role of the alternative, the lex 
fori, submitting the question of a choice of law clause’s separability to 
the putative governing law of the contract seems to be a sensible 
solution. 
V. Conclusion 
33 Where void contracts are concerned, logically intractable 
problems abound. In CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal showed that it was possible to approach the 
                                                                       
32 Adrian Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (OUP, 2008), 
especially ch 3. 
33 See Part IV(B) of this article. 
34 It should be noted that legal justifications stemming from drawing an analogy with 
arbitration and jurisdiction clauses (which are separable from the contract) are less 
persuasive given that the analogy is imperfect; arbitration and jurisdiction clauses 
are procedural in nature whereas choice of law clauses are substantive in nature. 
35 Jonathan Harris, “Does Choice of Law Make Any Sense?” (2004) 57 Current Legal 
Problems 305 at 326. 
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issue of when a choice of law clause could be applied to the 
restitutionary consequences of voidness with a mixture of pragmatism 
and principle. The court did much to clarify and articulate the rules in 
this area, but it is submitted that, arguably, it ultimately did not apply 
those same principles wholeheartedly to the case at hand. 
 
